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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent series of four Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") reports on
"noncash contributions"' contains some dramatic information. The most ex-
citing and mysterious data relate to the average value of donated conserva-
tion easements.2 It turns out that Americans are remarkably generous when
giving away conservation easements. As Figure 1 shows, Americans give
away easements in enormously valuable chunks' in comparison to other
kinds of real and personal property.4
' See Janette Wilson & Michael Strudler, Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions,
2003, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Spring 2006, 58 [here-
inafter IRS 2006]; Janette Wilson & Michael Strudler, Individual Noncash Contributions,
2004, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Spring 2007, 78 [herein-
after IRS 2007]; Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Spring 2008, 68 [hereinafter IRS 2008]; Pearson
Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2006, INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Summer 2009, 67 [hereinafter IRS 2009].
2 A conservation easement is "a nonpossessory interest ... in real property imposing
limitations or affirmative obligations" on the holder of the underlying land. Uniform Conser-
vation Easement Act § 1(1) (1981) ("UCEA"). See infra Part H.
The IRS does not track contribution data on a return-by-return basis. Letter from IRS to
Author (July 2, 2009) (on file with Author). IRS statisticians compile estimates of the number
and value of noncash contributions using a random sample chosen from the population of
returns. See, e.g., IRS 2006, supra note 1, at 67. For tax year 2003, the sample consisted of
182,810 returns; the population totaled 131,291,334. Id. at 27, 706. About 28,000 of the
sampled returns included a Form 8283 ("Noncash Charitable Contributions"), used by taxpay-
ers who make noncash donations in excess of $500. Id. at 58, 67. IRS statisticians gather
data, e.g., information on the type of property donated and the claimed fair market value of
that property, for each noncash donation listed on the forms. Id. at 67.
4 Art, intellectual property, securities, and real estate are the next four most-highly-valued
kinds of donated property.
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Figure 1: Average per-donation value of the five most valuable kinds
of donated property, 2003-2006 (relationship between these values
and the arithmetic mean of all filers' charitable donations measured
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Looking at these numbers, one might conclude that donors of these five
types of property are more generous than the average charitable donor. The
I This chart presents data in the four IRS bulletins cited in footnote 1. In the 2008 and
2009 bulletins (covering the 2005 and 2006 tax years, respectively), the IRS provides data
separately for conservation easements and fagade (historic preservation) easements. IRS 2008,
supra note 1, at 69; IRS 2009, supra note 1, at 68. In the two earlier bulletins, those data are
grouped together. IRS 2006, supra note 1, at 59; IRS 2007, supra note 1, at 78. In order to
illustrate data from all four tax years in Figure 1, I grouped conservation and fagade easement
data together. This grouping likely results in an understatement of average donated-easement
values: in tax years 2005 and 2006, the average values of fagade easements were significantly
lower than conservation easement values. IRS 2008, supra note 1, at 69; IRS 2009, supra note
1, at 68.
In creating Figure 1, I excluded a sixth type of property donation, "other vehicles," for
which average donations were in the $8,000 to $10,000 range, because the data was grouped
with automobile donation data in 2003 and 2004. IRS 2006, supra note 1, at 59; IRS 2007,
supra note 1, at 78.
I calculated the average values of donated property used in this figure, and throughout the
Article, by dividing the total amount claimed by easement donors on Form 1040, Schedule A
by the number of donations made. I used the Schedule A figure instead of the reported fair
market value of the easements because the fair market value figure would overstate the extent
to which easement donors are actually giving away property of deductible value. In other
words, the Schedule A figure represents the maximum amount an easement owner can claim
as a deduction. IRS 2009, supra note 1, at 69-70.
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average art donor, for example, would by virtue of an average gift of art,
rank among the top 1% of all charitable donors.6
Simply making a large gift, though, does not make one generous. The
dictionary definition of "generous" is "showing readiness to give more of
something, especially money, than is strictly necessary or expected."' With
regard to charitable donations, what is expected? One way to think about
this is to say that a person making an average gift is doing what is expected.
In order to say something about an individual's generosity, then, we would
compare the size of his gift to the size of a mean gift. It is also necessary to
take wealth into account: an acceptable measure of generosity should recog-
nize that a person who gives away his last dollar is more generous than a
person who gives away two dollars of his two million. Thus, in assessing an
individual's generosity, we will want to know not only the absolute size of
his gift, but also the mean value of donations made by individuals of similar
wealth.
The IRS's noncash contribution data make it possible to correlate tax-
payers' adjusted gross income ("AGI") with the kinds of property donated
and the value of those donations.' By doing this, it is possible to determine
whether conservation easement donors are more generous than land donors
or simply wealthier. Figure 2 illustrates:9
6 This estimate is based on data and coefficients of variation available on the IRS website.
See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETuRNs 2003: PUBLICATION
1304 at Table 2.1CV (2005), http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id= 134951,00.
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
'OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 721 (2d ed. 2005).
8 A taxpayer's AGI is her total income, less several above-the-line deductions. 26 I.R.C.
§ 62 (2006). Charitable deductions are below-the-line deductions; that is, they are subtracted
from AGI in calculating taxable income. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-lT(a)(1) (1988).
Income is by no means a perfect proxy for wealth; however, the two are often related. The
ideal way to study willingness to part would be to group donors by a more direct wealth
measure such as net worth. I use AGI because that data is available in the IRS charitable
contribution data sets. See, e.g., IRS 2006, supra note 1.
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This picture shows that donors with relatively equal incomes make
larger individual donations of some kinds of property than others, and that
the patterns are consistent. Donors in all income groups are more willing to
part with easements, for example, than with securities. Easement donors are
particularly generous: they are ready to give more property to charity than
expected.
This Article offers an explanation for why easement donors appear
more generous than donors of other types of property. Part II describes con-
servation easements as property interests and also explains the law and regu-
lations governing easement donations. This background is necessary to
understanding the various possible explanations for donated-easement gener-
osity laid out in Parts III and IV. The hypotheses offered in Part III ulti-
mately prove unconvincing. The hypothesis presented in Part IV, though,
appears to have traction. It suggests that the easement values are high be-
cause many easement donors are giving away something that, while possibly
valuable to someone else, is of little value to them. If correct - and there
does not appear to be another viable explanation for the data - it means that
donors should be willing to accept an amount less than the current tax bene-
10 This chart is based on data contained in four IRS bulletins. See sources cited supra
note 1. The IRS provided me with additional data that separated easements from other kinds
of real property donations for several of the years in question. (Data on file with Author.)
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fit in return for their donations. Thus, some amount of tax revenue foregone
under the current approach represents waste. Part V explores various legis-
lative changes aimed at eliminating this wasted revenue and thereby improv-
ing the efficiency of subsidies for easement acquisition. Part VI briefly
concludes.
II. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND EASEMENT DONATIONS
This Section describes the nature of the property interest that landown-
ers are donating to charity and the specifics of federal law and regulations
governing that donation (or, more precisely, the deductibility of that
donation)."
A. Conservation Easements as a Malleable Form of Property
1. A Hybrid Servitude...
As Professor Federico Cheever has observed, conservation easements
differ significantly from what the common law would have called an ease-
ment.12 First, the common law only permitted a limited number of negative
easements: to prevent landowners from blocking air, light, or artificial
streams; or, to prevent landowners from acts that might destabilize structures
on adjacent parcels. 3 The common law would not have enforced an at-
tempted conservation easement. However, conservation easements do re-
semble the traditional negative easements insofar as they allow easement
holders to prevent activity on servient tenements.14
Second, unlike common law negative easements, the typical conserva-
tion easement grants the holder affirmative rights, that is, the right to do
something on that land." Most conservation easements allow the holder to
enter onto the property in order to monitor the landowner's compliance with
" For an excellent description of the law of conservation easements, see Peter M. Morris-
ette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment on Private
Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCEs J. 373 (2001).
Q Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Con-
servation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1077,
1080-81 (1996).
' JOSEPH WILIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 212 (2d ed. 2005). The common
law's negative view of negative easements can be explained by remembering that, in an era
without good land records, land buyers would have had a difficult time seeing evidence of a
negative easement during their pre-purchase inspection of the property. Id.
14 In easement terminology, the dominant tenement (or parcel) is the parcel that benefits
from the easement, and the servient tenement is the parcel that is affected by the easement. In
an in-gross easement, in which an individual holds the "dominant" rights, which do not attach
to a particular piece of property, there would be an easement holder and a servient tenement.
Id.
'1 UCEA § 4(5) (1981). Although state laws authorizing the creation of conservation
easements vary, the UCEA is the basis for many. See Cheever, supra note 12, at 1082-83.
For purposes of simplicity, this article will focus on the terms of the UCEA.
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the terms of the easement or to conduct biological assessments.16 Such ac-
tivities are only possible with access to the property. Along the same lines,
conservation easements may contain provisions that allow the holder to enter
onto the property in order to apply land treatments, such as controlled bums
or the eradication of invasive species." Finally, conservation easements
might also contain covenant-like provisions which require the landowner to
perform certain affirmative acts, such as applying land treatments on a regu-
lar basis.'"
2. Containing a Flexible Set of Restrictions...
It is possible to craft an accurate, but general, definition of a conserva-
tion easement: it is "a legally binding agreement between the owner of the
land subject to the easement and the holder of the easement that restricts the
development and future use of the land to achieve certain conservation
goals . . . ."'9 While all conservation easements meet this broad definition,
land-use restrictions and other terms contained in individual conservation
easements often vary from property to property. 20 As the Open Space Insti-
tute, a New York land trust, explains, "[elach conservation easement is tai-
16 See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements - A Troubled Adolescence, 26 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 47, 48 (2005); Alexander R. Arpad, Private Transactions,
Public Benefits, and Perpetual Control of the Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation
Easements as Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91, 117 (2002). Biological
assessments are intended to provide information to the easement holder regarding the status of
fish, wildlife, or plants with which it is concerned. This information can be valuable to an
easement holder that has ecological goals for a larger region of which the individual parcel is
but one piece. Pursuant to federal tax regulations, if the easement contains provisions that
would allow the landowner to exercise rights that might impair the "conservation interests
associated with the property," then
the donor must agree to notify the donee, in writing, before exercising any reserved
right, e.g. the right to extract certain minerals which may have an adverse impact on
the conservation interests associated with the qualified real property interest. The
terms of the donation must provide a right of the donee to enter the property at
reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting the property to determine if there is
compliance with the terms of the donation. Additionally, the terms of the donation
must provide a right of the donee to enforce the conservation restrictions by appro-
priate legal proceedings, including but not limited to, the right to require the restora-
tion of the property to its condition at the time of the donation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) & (ii) (1999).
17 See A.M. Merenlender et al., Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: Who is Con-
serving What for Whom, 18 CONs. BIo. 65, 67-68 (2004).
18 Id. at 67.
'9 Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private
Lands, 38 IDAHO L. REv. 453, 453 (2002).
20 Jeff Pidot provides this example: "A study by the Bay Area Open Space Council (1999)
showed that roughly half of the conservation easement holders surveyed did not use a model
easement ..... JEFF PIDOT, REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMErrs: A CRrIcAL EXAMINA-
TION AND IDEAS FOR REFORM 8 (2005).
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lored to fit the needs and desires of each individual landowner and the parcel
of land. No two are alike." 21 According to Jeff Pidot,
[i]t is often stated that each conservation easement should be
unique and negotiated to the parties' particular specifications ....
Indeed, the framers of the [UCEA] intended to provide a loose
legal framework with latitude for the parties to arrange their rela-
tionships as they saw fit.2
Professor Gerald Korngold provides some examples of the various re-
strictions that might be contained in a conservation easement:
Easement documents typically include specific clauses, such as
those that limit or prohibit additional building on the premises,
timber cutting or tree removal, subdivision of the parcel, grants of
rights-of-way easements, construction of roads and driveways,
storage of trash, the use of all-terrain vehicles, or disturbance of
the surface.23
Easement terms are also malleable in the extent to which they explicitly
permit post-easement-creation land use.24 As The Nature Conservancy, the
nation's largest land trust,25 explains:
There is no one-size-fits-all conservation easement. Each one is
individually tailored to meet conservation objectives and the needs
of the landowner . . .. Easements are . . . tailored to meet a land-
owner's needs, such as the need to build a house in the future for a
daughter's family or the need to continue to derive income from
the land through ranching.
[Easement terms] are designed to meet the needs of both parties
by targeting only those rights (e.g., commercial development) nec-
essary to accomplish specific conservation objectives.26
21 Open Space Institute, Land Conservation at OSI, www.osiny.org/site/DocServer/
ConservationEasements2.pdfdoclD= 122 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).22 PIDOT, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
23 Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements:
Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH
L. REv. 1039, 1045 (2007).
2 The easement cannot actually exist prior to the closing of the donation transaction; a
landowner cannot hold an easement on her own property. SINGER, supra note 13, at 211-12.
S"[The Nature Conservancy] holds more easements (1983) and more acres of easements
(3.2 million) than any other land trust in the U.S. These holdings represent more than one
third of the total conservation easement acreage held by U.S. land trusts." Joseph M.
Kiesecker et al., Conservation Easements in Context: A Quantitative Analysis of Their Use by
The Nature Conservancy, 5 FRONT. ECOL. ENVION. 125, 126 (2007).26 The Nature Conservancy, All About Conservation Easements, http://www.nature.org/
aboutus/howwework/conservationethods/privatelands/conservationeasements/about/allabout.
html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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Donors and donees can write easements so that they allow uses such as
farming, ranching, and the construction of additional, personal residences.
27
According to the American Farmland Trust, "[aigricultural conservation
easements often permit commercial development related to the farm opera-
tion or the construction of farm buildings." 28 In 2007, The Nature Conser-
vancy did a study of easements "explicitly designed to preserve
biodiversity" and found that about fifty percent of easements created be-
tween 1984 and 1994 and about twenty percent created between 1995 and
2004 permit the landowner to subdivide the land, presumably for the pur-
poses of building and selling additional homes.
29
Because of their hybrid nature and the flexibility of their terms, conser-
vation easements therefore represent something of an exception to the prin-
ciple of numerus clausus.
30
3. That Lasts Forever?
In two important ways, conservation easements are not so flexible:
first, most parties create them with the intent that they will last in
perpetuity;31 second, consistent with this intent, they are difficult to termi-
nate.3 2 Both of these features are products of the combination of the state
27 In a recent study, fifty-three percent of easements examined "allowed for some type of
commercial land use such as ranching, recreation, forestry, farming, or lodging and camping."
Adena R. Rissman et al., Conservation Easements: Biodiversity Protection and Private Use,
21 CONS. Bio. 709, 715 (2007).
28 American Farmland Trust, Agricultural Conservation Easements Fact Sheet, http://
www.farmlandinfo.org/ documents/27762/ACE 06-2008.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). The
American Farmland Trust is "the nation's leading conservation organization dedicated to sav-
ing America's farm and ranch land, promoting environmentally sound farming practices and
supporting a sustainable future for farms." About Us, American Farmland Trust, http://www.
farmland.org/about/default.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).
29 Kiesecker et al., supra note 25, at 126, 128; see also Rissman, supra note 27 (noting
that most easements surveyed allow for the construction of additional structures, and many of
these easements contain no limits on how large those structures can be).
30 As explained by Merrill and Smith, the principle is that "the law will enforce as prop-
erty only those interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms." Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000). The primary purpose behind the principle is the
avoidance of what Merrill and Smith call "externalit[ies] involving measurement costs":
"[p]arties who create new property rights will not take into account the full magnitude of the
measurement costs they impose on strangers to the title." Id. at 26-27. The costs of commu-
nicating "idiosyncratic property rights" will hinder what would otherwise be socially benefi-
cial transactions. Id. at 27. Merrill and Smith believe non-possessory interests are generally
subject to the principle. Id. at 16. Because of the extremely malleable nature of conservation
easements, I am not as sure. It may not matter: marketability rationales are not relevant be-
cause conservation easements are, after the initial creation, not meant for re-sale. It might
matter, though, when it comes to valuing property encumbered by an easement. See infra Part
II.B.3.
" See Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future,
88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).
32 Id. at 769 ("[C]onservation easements are engineered to be hard to undo."). But see
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices of
Future Generations, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601, 609 (2004) ("Freeing land from a perpetual
552011]
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property law authorizing the creation of easements and federal laws, includ-
ing tax law.
Although the UCEA provides that "a conservation easement may
be ... released, modified, terminated, or otherwise altered or affected in the
same manner as other easements," there are obstacles to these events occur-
ring.33 First, federal law encourages the creation of permanent conservation
easements. Federal tax law, for example, allows a landowner to deduct the
value of a donated easement only if that easement is permanent.3 In addi-
tion, if a conservation easement is used to create a wetlands mitigation bank,
federal regulations allow the bank to sell mitigation credits only if the wet-
lands are subject to permanent restriction.3 1
Second, by requiring that only government agencies and non-profit land
trusts can hold conservation easements, state and federal laws make it diffi-
cult to terminate conservation easements.16 A charitable holder would invite
the scrutiny of state and federal officials if it terminated or modified a con-
servation easement in a way that seemed contrary to the organization's chari-
table purpose. Charities may lose their tax exempt status if they engage in
activities inconsistent with their stated purposes. 37 Where the easement is
held by a government agency, an attempt to terminate or modify would
likely attract unwanted public attention; moreover, a court might find that
effort to be unlawful. 38
B. Federal Tax Law and Easement Donations
Congress first authorized income tax deductions for donated conserva-
tion easements in 1976.19 Since that time, critics have occasionally called
conservation easement, although difficult, may be far easier to accomplish than changing a
constitutional conservancy or a public park .... Even if the land trust has no interest in giving
up its easement, the owner of the fee simple may be able to escape the easement's restrictions
on various legal grounds.").
13 UCEA § 2(a) (1981).
3 See discussion infra note 61.
35 Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60
Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,612 (Nov. 28, 1995) ("The wetlands and/or other aquatic resources in a
mitigation bank should be protected in perpetuity with appropriate real estate arrangements
(e.g., conservation easements, transfer of title to Federal or State resource agency or non-profit
conservation organization).").
3 The UCEA provides that only "a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in
real property" or "a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust" formed
for conservation purposes, may hold a conservation easement. UCEA § 1(2)(i)-(ii) (1981).
See also, 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(B) (2006).
" David Biemesderfer and Andras Kosaras, The Value of Relationships Between State
Charity Regulators and Philanthropy 11 (2006), available at http://www.givingforum.org/s
forum/bin.asp?CID=2983&DID=9298&DOC=FILE.PDF.
38 Cf Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y.
2001). Although the case did not involve termination of a conservation easement, court stated
that "parkland is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before it can be
alienated or used for an extended period for non-park purposes." Id.
3 McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 455:
56 [Vol. 35
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for reform or repeal. 0 Despite criticisms, Congress has to date neither re-
duced the amount of available tax benefit nor eliminated deductibility alto-
gether. If anything, Congress has, over the years, increased tax incentives. 41
Today, those incentives include not only the income tax deduction found in
Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), but also the
estate tax deduction at Section 2031(c). 42
Several key points need to be emphasized for purposes of the analysis
here. First, conservation easement deductions are an exception to a general
statutory prohibition on deducting donations of partial interests in property. 43
Second, the Code only allows deductions for easements that are both perma-
nent and exclusively intended to achieve one of four stated conservation
purposes." Third, the fair market value of conservation easements is usually
determined by the "before and after" method of appraisal. 45
The Internal Revenue Service first officially recognized the availability of a charita-
ble income tax deduction for the donation of a conservation easement in 1964, but it
was not until the Tax Reform Act of 1976 that the first express statutory authority for
the deductibility of donated conservation easements was enacted.
Professor McLaughlin and others have done an excellent and thorough job laying out the
history and mechanics of the federal tax law as it relates to donations of conservation ease-
ments. See Nancy A. McLaughlin and Mark Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest
and Investment in Conservation: A Response to Professor Korngold's Critique of Conservation
Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561, 1569 n.33 (2008); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the
Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations - A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1, 10-17 (2004); McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 455-58. For additional discussions of
federal law on conservation easements, see C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of
Conservation Easements, 5 Wyo. L. REv. 1, 3 n.5 (2005); BARBARA L. KIRSCHTEN & CARLA
NEELEY FREITAG, 521-3D T.M., CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: INCOME TAX ASPECTS A-76A-
93 (2008).
' See, e.g., DEPT OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF TAX
DEDUCTIONS FOR DONATIONS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (1987), reprinted in TAX NOTES
TODAY, Dec. 18, 1987, Lexis, 7987 TNT 248-6; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
109TH CONG., OPrIoNs TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES
277-87 (2005). The following papers also have suggested that reforms are needed: Korngold,
supra note 23; John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners. to Protect the
Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL L. 1 (2005); Carol Necole Brown, A Time to
Preserve: A Call for Formal Private-Party Rights in Perpetual Conservation Easements, 40
GA. L. REv. 85 (2005); Julia LeMense Huff, Protecting Ecosystems Using Conservation Tax
Incentives: How Much Bang Do We Get for Our Buck?, 11 Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 138
(2004); Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88
VA. L. REV. 739 (2002); PIDOT, supra note 20.
4 For example, Congress added the estate tax benefit in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34 § 508 (1997). In addition, in 2006, Con-
gress added Section 170(b)(1)(E) to the Internal Revenue Code. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 206
(2006). This provision loosened generally applicable temporal restrictions on the use of ease-
ment donation deductions to reduce income. KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note 39 at A-136.
42 26 U.S.C. § 2031(c) (2006).
43 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3) (2006).
4 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4) (2006).
45 See KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note 39, at A-90.
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1. Deductions for Donations of Partial Interests in Property
Allowing a deduction for the charitable donation of a conservation
easement is an exception to the general rule barring deductions for donations
of partial interests in property.46 There are only three such statutory excep-
tions: remainders in personal residences or farms, co-tenancies, and conser-
vation easements (or as the Code calls them, "qualified conservation
contributions"). 47
When Congress first barred deductions for donations of partial property
interests in 1969, by adding Section 170(f)(3) to the Code, the rationale ex-
pressed in the legislative history was that such donations created the possi-
bility of double deductions for donors "who donated to a charity the use of
property for a limited period of time." 4 8 For example, the owner of a com-
mercial building who allowed a charitable organization to use an office rent-
free could both exclude the non-received rent from her income and then
further reduce her income by virtue of the charitable deduction. 49 In banning.
deductions for partial interests, Congress limited this donor to the same tax
benefit received by the landlord who had rented out the office and then
donated the proceeds to charity. 0
Even though the double-benefit lease transaction was the only partial
interest problem that Congress specifically identified in 1969, it is clear from
both the language of Section 170(f)(3)(A), 1 and court interpretations of that
language,52 that the provision "broadly prohibit[s] charitable contribution
deductions of less than a taxpayer's entire interest in property.""
- 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2006).
47 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(B) (2006). In addition to these statutory exceptions, there are
also some regulatory exceptions. For example, the regulations provide that a taxpayer is enti-
tled to a deduction for the donation of a partial interest when that interest is donated to one
charitable organization at the same time as the donor donates all of her remaining interest in
the property to another charity. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(2)(ii); see also KIRSCHTEN & FREI-
TAG, supra note 39, at A-69-A-73 (describing two other such exceptions); Scott Andrew Bow-
man & Danaya C. Wright, Charitable Deductions for Rail-Trail Conversions: Reconciling the
Partial Interest Rule and the National Trails System Act, 32 WM. & MARY ENvT'L. L. & POLY
REV. 581, 595-610 (2008).
48 KIRSCHTEN & FRErrAG, supra note 39, at A-68.
49 Id.
50 In other words, each would receive a deduction equal to the value of the rent.
' Section 170(f)(3)(A) provides that:
In the case of a contribution (not made by a transfer in trust) of an interest in prop-
erty which consists of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property, a
deduction shall be allowed under this section only to the extent that the value of the
interest contributed would be allowable as a deduction under this section if such
interest had been transferred in trust. For purposes of this subparagraph, a contribu-
tion by a taxpayer of the right to use property shall be treated as a contribution of
less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property.
26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2006). This is sometimes known as the "partial interest rule." See
Bowman & Wright, supra note 47, at 595.52 See, e.g., Logan v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 658 (1994); Stjernholm v. Comm'r, 58
T.C.M. (CCH) 389 (1989); Stark v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 243 (1986).
53 KIRSCHTEN & FRErrAG, supra note 39 at A-68.
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Although Congress later specifically exempted conservation easements
from the "partial-interest rule," it did not do so unaware of potential
problems. 54 In fact, at a 1979 hearing before the House Ways and Means
Committee, (now Professor, then Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Depart-
ment of the Treasury) Daniel I. Halperin argued that:
[I]t may well be difficult to ascertain the diminution in market
value of a parcel of property resulting from the transfer of less
than the taxpayer's entire interest in the property for conservation
purposes .... While valuation problems arise under other parts of
section 170, the difficulties with valuing partial interests in real
property may be particularly acute, especially where such interests
have no impact on the donor's current enjoyment of the property.
Second, for a taxpayer who does not have the present intention to
sell or develop the property, the gift of, for example, a conserva-
tion easement, while perhaps diminishing the value of the prop-
erty, does not do so until a later date; in particular, it may have no
material impact on the continuing enjoyment of the property by
the donor of the easement."
In these comments, Halperin identifies two problems: first, establishing
an accurate value for an easement is difficult because it is not clear when the
donor would have exercised the donated property rights; second, and related,
there is a possibility that donors' incentives will be distorted because the
rights being donated, measured at the moment of donation, have little value
to them. Both of these problems emanate from the fact that conservation
easements are negative partial interests in property. As discussed in Part
IV.B, negative partial interest donations create a fundamentally different
kind of tax concern than transfer-of-temporal-interest problems such as the
double-benefit lease.
2. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements
In order for a donated conservation easement to qualify for a tax deduc-
tion, it must constitute what the law calls a "qualified conservation contribu-
tion."5 6 The requirements of a qualified conservation contribution are laid
out in Section 170(h) of the Code and further explained in the relevant regu-
lations." There are four essential qualifying features."
See id.
* Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearing on H.R. 4611 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 12 (1979) (statement of Daniel I.
Halperin, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Treasury Dep't).
56 See 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (1999).
58 The statute sets out what appears to be three elements of a deductible easement:
Qualified conservation contribution.
(1) In general. For purposes of subsection (f)(3)(B)(iii), the term "qualified conser-
vation contribution" means a contribution -
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First, the easement must be a "qualified real property interest." 9 This
means that it must be, if not an entire interest or a remainder interest, then "a
restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made" of the
underlying real property." This provision contains two elements that must
be satisfied. First, the easement must be permanent. Although the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act suggests that conservation easements of lesser
duration would constitute recognized property interests as a matter of state
property law, the donation of such easements will not give rise to a federal
tax deduction.6' Second, the easement must restrict use of the underlying
property. In other words, the land-use restrictions contained in the easement
must not duplicate applicable local, state, or federal land-use restrictions,
such as those that might be found in a zoning ordinance, or private restric-
tions, such as those that might be found in subdivision covenants. 62 It is
important to emphasize that a qualifying easement does not have to restrict
all use of the underlying property nor even limit post-easement use to levels
of pre-easement use; a conservation easement will meet the test if it ensures
that, post-easement, the property will continue to provide some benefit to the
public. 63
The second element of a qualified conservation contribution is that the
easement be donated to a "qualified organization."6 These donees are, gen-
erally speaking, 65 government agencies and what are often known as "land
trusts." 66 Land trusts play a central role in easement donations and the suc-
(A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization,
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes.
26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1) (2006). Kirschten and Freitag, however, break the third requirement,
that the easement be "exclusively for conservation purposes," into two parts, "conservation
purposes" and "exclusively for conservation purposes." KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note
39, at A-77. For reasons discussed later in the Article, I believe this to be the correct approach.
5 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(A) (2006).
- 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2) (2006).
61 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006). How does the law ensure that the easement actually
lasts forever? The tax code does not, but the applicable regulations provide that where a
conservation easement is later terminated due to an "unexpected change in the conditions
surrounding the property" that "makes impossible or impractical the continued use of the
property for conservation purposes," the proceeds must be used by the land trust in "a manner
consistent with the conservation purposes of the original contribution." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
14(c)(2) (2009).
The donation of a less-than-permanent easement may be deductible under state tax law. See
Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., et al., Conservation Easements: What Are They and Who Partici-
pates?, Horizons (Virginia's Rural Economic Analysis Program, Blacksburg, Va.), Jan./Feb.
2005, at n.1.
62 See KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note 39, at A-78.
63 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2) (1999) ("Any rights reserved by the donor in the
donation of a perpetual conservation restriction must conform to the requirements of this
section.").
*26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(B) (2006).
6 There are no available data on the percentage of easements donated to the various types
of qualified organizations.
* For the technical definition of "qualified organization," see 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(3)
(2006) and Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c) (1999). See also KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note
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cess or failure of the conservation easement tax subsidy program. 67 They are
the gatekeepers of that program, deciding which easements to accept, negoti-
ating the terms of those easements, and monitoring and enforcing those
terms.6 8
Land trusts are not required to accept every potential easement dona-
tion. Beyond the legal requirement that a land trust can accept only those
easements whose purposes are consistent with the trust's stated goals,69 indi-
vidual land trusts may reject an easement for a variety of reasons associated
with the costs of accepting and maintaining a conservation easement. Land
trusts need to expend time and money on negotiating and drafting easement
terms and must verify that the appraiser's valuation is accurate. 70 Once an
easement is in place, the land trust should be interested in monitoring and
enforcing its terms. This can also involve significant expense.7' Moreover,
if a trust accepts a technically legal, but subjectively substandard, easement,
it risks harm to both its external reputation and internal morale.
39, at A-78-A-79. In the case of historic preservation easements, the common nomenclature is
"trust for historic preservation" or "preservation trust." See, e.g., CONNECTICUT TRUST FOR
HISTORIC PRESERVATION http://www.cttrust.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010); PRESERVATION
TRUST OF SPARTANBURG http://www.preservespartanburg.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). For
the purposes of simplicity, all easement donees will hereinafter generally be referred to as
"land trusts."
67 See McLaughlin, supra note 19; Erin B. Gisler, Land Trusts in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: How Tax Abuse and Corporate Governance Threaten the Integrity of Charitable Land
Preservation, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1123 (2009).
6 See generally LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, STARTING A LAND TRUST: A GUIDE TO FORMING
A LAND CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION (1990). For a description of how the country's largest
land trust, the Nature Conservancy, makes selection decisions, see Kiesecker et al., supra note
25 at 126.
' 9 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (1999).
70 The donor, land trust, and appraiser may be subject to civil or criminal penalties for
overstatements of fair market value. See KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note 39, at A-197-A-
206; Notice 2004-41, 2004-28 I.R.B. 31.
" Gerald Korngold provides a more skeptical view:
While many organizations do a fine job of stewarding the conservation easements
that they hold, others do not fare as well. Quality stewardship requires periodic
inspection and monitoring of the burdened property, discussions with the fee land-
owner over general issues and incipient and actual violations, and enforcement ac-
tions if resolution of disputes becomes impossible. Without adequate stewardship,
the conservation benefit to be enjoyed by the public dissipates. Where a tax benefit
accompanied the creation of the easement, this means that the public has paid for a
conservation advantage that has been squandered through inaction or misjudgments
of a nongovernmental organization . ...
There has been a concerted effort by leading conservation groups to provide edu-
cation and best practices for stewardship, as well as a recommendation that nonprof-
its seek accompanying stewardship funds from donors of conservation easements.
This advice may help the situation - longitudinal studies will ultimately tell the
story. But more importantly, these steps are not mandatory on nonprofits and there
is no evidence that they will be adopted and implemented effectively, especially by
those low-performing nonprofits who most need to upgrade their operations.
Korngold, supra note 23, at 1062-63.
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The third requirement is that the easement must be created "for conser-
vation purposes."7 2 There are four permissible varieties of conservation pur-
pose: enhancing opportunities for public recreation or education;73 protecting
land that provides "relatively natural habitat" for fish, wildlife, or plants, or
contains a "similar ecosystem";7 4 preserving open space "for the scenic en-
joyment of the general public" or pursuant to a government conservation
policy;" or, finally, preserving "a historically important land area or a certi-
fied historic structure." 7 6
The conservation purpose requirement ensures that the public receive
some minimum amount of benefit from the creation of the easement.77 The
first type, the recreation and education easement, is the only type which
requires that members of the public have the right to actual physical access
onto the underlying real property.78 The next type, the relatively natural
habitat or ecosystem easement, provides a public benefit insofar as it perma-
nently protects land values that contribute to the health of fish, wildlife, or
plant populations.79 The third type, open space easements, benefit the public
by improving landscape aesthetics, regulating harmful forms of growth
72 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(c) (2006).
7 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
74 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
7 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii) (2006). "Open space" easements must yield "a signifi-
cant public benefit." Id. The inclusion of this language in the statute is clearly not intended to
imply that other kinds of easements do not have to provide a public benefit; rather, the impli-
cation is that the preserved scenery must be visually accessible to some minimum number of
people. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(B), (d)(4)(iv)(A)(6) (1999). If an open space ease-
ment is created pursuant to a government policy, that policy must be "clearly delineated." 26
U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii) (2006).
76 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) (2006).
" In other words, the requirement eliminates the possibility that easements might be cre-
ated to protect land or structures that do not possess significant, pre-easement conservation
value.
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(2)(ii) (2009). Historic preservation easements created pur-
suant to Section 170(h)(4)(A)(iv) may require public physical access if
the historic land area or certified historic structure which is the subject of the dona-
tion is not visible from a public way (e.g., the structure is hidden from view by a
wall or shrubbery, the structure is too far from the public way, or interior characteris-
tics and features of the structure are the subject of the easement).
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(iv)(A) (1999). Public access may actually run counter to the
conservation purposes of habitat or ecosystem protection easements created pursuant to Sec-
tion 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) due to the fact that such access might disturb habitat or wildlife. See,
e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200208019 (Feb. 22, 2002).
' As many scholars have noted, the protection of habitat is crucial to the long-term con-
servation of species, and the protection of habitat on private land is particularly important. See
Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REv.
325, 336 (2002) ("More than ninety percent of [species listed as endangered or threatened
under the Endangered Species Act] occur on private lands, and roughly two-thirds depend on
private lands for at least sixty percent of their habitat.") (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT: INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL
LANDS 4 (1995)); Craig Groves et al., Owning Up to Our Responsibilities: Who Owns Lands
Important for Biodiversity, in PRECIOUs HERITAGE: THE STATUS OF BIODIVERsrrY IN THE
UNITED STATES 275 (B. Stein et al., eds., 2000). Put differently, "fewer than 10% of endan-
gered species occur exclusively on public land." Kiesecker et al., supra note 25, at 125 (citing
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(such as sprawl), and preserving traditional land uses (such as farming or
ranching).so Finally, by maintaining the historic appearance of land or build-
ings, historic preservation easements supply public goods such as cultural
connections with the past, visible examples of important architectural
achievements, and, in some cases, the economic viability of a neighborhood
or a larger area."1
In order for the easement to provide a public benefit, the underlying
land must have provided some pre-easement public benefit.82 Thus, the
"conservation purposes" requirement is a tool for ensuring that only appro-
priate properties are eligible for participation in the conservation easement
program. The regulations support this view insofar as they focus on the pre-
easement conservation qualities of the property.83
The fourth, and final, requirement is that the easement be created "ex-
clusively for conservation purposes."M In contrast to the "conservation pur-
poses" requirement, which is meant to ensure that only beneficial properties
qualify for participation in the program, the "exclusively for conservation
purposes" requirement is a means of ensuring that qualifying properties pro-
J. Michael Scott, et al., Nature Reserves: Do They Capture the Full Range of America's Bio-
logical Diversity?, 11 ECOL. APPL. 999 (2001)).
The habitat or ecosystem easement is particularly useful in this effort for two reasons. First,
it is a more politically feasible means of protecting habitat on private land than the alternative,
that is, regulation. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Providing Biodiversity Through Policy Diver-
sity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 355, 368-69 (2002) ("[Pjroperty owners are less likely to oppose
governmental investment programs than to oppose regulation."). Second, current federal and
state wildlife laws focus on protecting the habitat of threatened and endangered species; ease-
ment subsidies, on the other hand, are available for "the protection of a relatively natural
habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants," without regard to the condition of populations dependent
on those habitats. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
so See Charles J. Fausold & Robert J. Lilieholm, The Economic Value of Open Space: A
Review and Synthesis, 23 ENvTL. MGMT. 307, 307-08 (1999); VIRGINIA MCCONNELL & MAR-
GARET WALLS, THE VALUE OF OPEN SPACE: EVIDENCE FROM STUDIES OF NONMARKET BENE-
errs (2005).
s" See David Listokin et al., The Contributions of Historic Preservation to Housing and
Economic Development, 9 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 431, 431-32 (1998); Ellen Edge Katz,
Conserving the Nation's Heritage Using the Uniform Conservation Easement Act, 43 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 369, 369-70 (1986).
82 Section 170(h) does not contemplate the donation of easements intended to promote the
restoration of land or structures that do not already provide a public benefit. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(h).
8 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1. 170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(A) (1999) ("the factors to be considered" in
whether preservation of a particular piece of land would provide a scenic enjoyment benefit
are: "(1) The compatibility of the land use with other land in the vicinity; (2) The degree of
contrast and variety provided by the visual scene; (3) The openness of the land (which would
be a more significant factor in an urban or densely populated setting or in a heavily wooded
area); (4) Relief from urban closeness; (5) The harmonious variety of shapes and textures;
(6) The degree to which the land use maintains the scale and character of the urban landscape
to preserve open space, visual enjoyment, and sunlight for the surrounding area; (7) The con-
sistency of the proposed scenic view with a methodical state scenic identification program,
such as a state landscape inventory; and (8) The consistency of the proposed scenic view with
a regional or local landscape inventory made pursuant to a sufficiently rigorous review pro-
cess, especially if the donation is endorsed by an appropriate state or local governmental
agency.")
8 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(C) (2006).
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vide post-easement public benefit. In other words, while meeting the "con-
servation purposes" requirement ensures that the land in question can
provide a recreational, ecological, scenic, or historic benefit, the "exclu-
sively for conservation purposes" requirement addresses the issue of how
much of that land's beneficial quality the conservation easement document
must preserve.
Again, the structure and language of the regulations seem to indicate
that this is the IRS's approach. The "exclusively for conservation purposes"
regulations are found in a separate section from the "conservation purposes"
regulations, and primarily address what the regulations call "inconsistent
use."" The regulations focus primarily on the kinds of uses the easement
can and cannot permit the landowner to undertake after creation of the con-
servation easement. So, the regulations provide that "[a] donor may con-
tinue a pre-existing use of the property that does not conflict with the
conservation purposes of the gift."'6 As to future, non-pre-existing uses
contemplated by the easement terms, the test is whether those uses, even if
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the easement, would "impair
significant conservation interests."a8 If they would not, then the easement
may permit them.8
Taken together, the two pieces establish what might be seen as an en-
velope of conservation purposes within which the land trust and the donor
are free to negotiate use restrictions. This is easiest to see in the context of
"relatively natural habitat" and scenic easements." In order for the land-
owner to qualify for a tax deduction, her property must have certain charac-
teristics: it must house some relatively natural habitat" or be sufficiently
scenic.91 However, once established, the easement terms are permitted to
allow future uses that result in changes to those characteristics. 92
There are two critical points for purposes of the discussion here. First,
assuming the property provides sufficient pre-easement public benefits, the
asTreas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1)-(2) (1999).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(3) (1999) (emphasis added).
87Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2) (1999).
8 Id.
89 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2006).
* Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (1999).
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii) (1999).
2 "Donors who donate conservation easements frequently reserve rights with respect to
existing or future uses of the property that do not impair the conservation purposes of the gift
and, therefore, do not jeopardize the allowance of a deduction." KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra
note 39 at A-86 (citing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200208019 (Feb. 22, 2002) (donor retained right
to develop eight residential lots); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9632003 (Aug. 9, 1996) (donor retained
rights to conduct ranching and agricultural activities and to construct related structures); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9603018 (Jan. 19, 1996) (donors retained rights to conduct agricultural, forestry,
and equestrian activities, to subdivide portions of the property, and to construct an additional
residence and associated improvements); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9318017 (May 7, 1993) (tax-
payer retained rights to create hiking trails, including footbridges, and to install and maintain
water systems and utility lines); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9218017 (May 1, 1992) (taxpayer re-
tained rights to conduct agricultural and timber activities, to hunt, fish, and gather firewood,
and to drill water wells)).
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law allows all pre-existing uses of the property to continue. 93 Second, vague
language such as "relatively natural" and "significant conservation inter-
ests" leaves open the possibility that the easement might permit the donor to
engage in a range of new, post-easement land uses. 94 Logically, the only
situation in which this would not be true is where the pre-easement property
barely met the "conservation purposes" test. Ironically, those properties
that easily clear the bar of the "conservation purposes" test, for example, the
most "relatively natural" properties, will be best positioned to legally ac-
commodate a high level of future inconsistent uses.95
3. Valuation Method and Issues
The tax law provides that, assuming all other requirements are met, the
donor is entitled to a deduction equal to the fair market value ("FMV") of
the easement.96 However, the law does not suggest how to measure the
FMV.97 Because there is no actual market for conservation easements, an
appraisal is required.
The law requires that a qualified appraiser value all conservation ease-
ment donations.98 Most appraisers use what is known as the "before and
after" method to estimate fair market value.99 Conceptually, this method is
simple. First, the appraiser estimates the value of the property before the
restrictions contained in the proposed conservation easement are in place. *0
Then, the appraiser estimates the value that the underlying property will re-
tain after the easement has been donated, that is, with the easement restric-
tions in place. The estimate of the easement's fair market value is the
difference between these two figures.' 0'
Valuing the unrestricted property is no different from valuing any other
parcel of real estate.102 In contrast, the appraiser will face a greater challenge
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(3) (1999).
9 The donor will be required to "pay" for these future uses in the form of a decreased tax
deduction because they increase the "after" value of the property used in valuing the ease-
ment. See infra Part IV.B.2.
9 Whether this in fact occurs will depend on the preferences of the donor and the land
trust and the extent to which the two parties press these preferences in negotiations.
96 According to the IRS, FMV is:
the price that property would sell for on the open market. It is the price that would
be agreed on by a willing buyer and a willing seller, with neither being required to
act, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts . . . . Determining the
[fair market] value of donated property would be a simple matter if you could rely
on fixed formulas, rules, or methods . . . . Using such formulas, etc., seldom results
in an acceptable determination of FMV. There is no single formula that always
applies when determining the value of property.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 561 2 (2007).
9 See KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note 39, at A-111-A- 113.
" 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(i 1) (2006).
9 KIRSCHTEN & FREITAG, supra note 39, at A-90.
"0 id at A-90-A-9 1.
10' Id.
o The regulations provide that the "before" value:
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in estimating the "after" value of the restricted property. The appraiser will
have a more difficult time finding recent sales data to include in his estimate,
owing to the fact that there may not be nearby comparable, and comparably
restricted, properties. 03 The fact that easements can vary greatly in the ex-
tent to which they permit post-easement inconsistent uses would make the
search for comparable "after" properties that much more difficult.'0
III. LESS-THAN-SATISFYING EXPLANATIONS OF DONATED-
EASEMENT GENEROSITY
Despite their flexibility, it is clear that conservation easements re-
present a meaningful property interest, one that can and does reduce the
value of the underlying parcel. So, what explains charitable donors' high
willingness to part with conservation easements?
One can conceive of several possible explanations. Before proceeding
to the most convincing hypothesis, laid out in Part IV, it is worth briefly
addressing some other, ultimately unsatisfying, possibilities.
In approaching the question, there are two avenues to explore. First,
one can focus on the donors. That is, conservation easement donors might
share a personal characteristic that explains their high willingness to part
with conservation easements. As explained below, two such characteristics
are wealth and the desire to make large, single gifts. A second avenue of
inquiry relates not to the donors, but to the easement-donation transaction.
Specifically, it could be that the incentives to donate easements are different
from the incentives to donate other kinds of property. In other words, the
costs of donating are lower or the benefits are higher.
A. Donor Characteristics
1. Wealth
The fact that the average donated easement has a fair market value of
nearly $500,000 might be explained by the fact, if proven, that most conser-
must take into account not only the current use of the property but also an objective
assessment of how immediate or remote the likelihood is that the property, absent
the restriction, would in fact be developed, as well as any effect from zoning, conser-
vation, or historic preservation laws that already restrict the property's potential high-
est and best use.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (1999).
This is consistent with general principles of real estate valuation. APPRAIsAL INsTrrUTE,
THE APPRAisAL OF REAL. ESTATE 305-27 (12th ed. 2001).
103 At least one reported case includes reference to an appraiser's "after" opinion relying
on sales of comparably restricted properties. Dennis v. United States, No. 92-0020-A, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15409, at *4--5 (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 28, 1992).
" See supra Part II.A.2.
66 [Vol. 35
Eagle, Notional Generosity
vation easement donors are very wealthy people. After all, who else could
afford to make such large charitable gifts? 0
The AGI of donors does not fully explain the high average FMV of
donated easements. The percentages of easement donors in high-AGI
groups are greater than the percentage of high-AGI filers generally. So, for
example, while individuals with AGIs between $2 million and $5 million
account for only .07 percent of filers,10 they make up 6.6 percent of ease-
ment donors.107 It is not, however, the case that lower-AGI individuals do
not donate easements. Individuals earning less than $500,000 account for
about 70 percent of easement donations; about 57 percent of those donors
report AGIs under $200,000.10s
Moreover, while easement donations made by high-AGI individuals
raise the average FMV of donated easements, the data on lower-AGI dona-
tions is still striking: the average FMV of easements donated by those re-
porting AGI under $500,000 is more than $260,000.01
More important, while wealth can be correlated to the average FMV of
donated easements, it does not explain donors' high willingness to part with
them. As illustrated by Figure 2,"o donors in all AGI groups are consistently
more willing to give away easements than any other kind of property. The
following table compares willingness to part with real estate and conserva-
tion easements across AGI groups:
105 It is worth reiterating that, due to limitations in IRS data, AGI must be used as (an
admittedly imperfect) proxy for wealth.
' IRS, Publication 1304, 34, tbl. 1.2 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil
06inalcr.pdf.
107 Data on file with Author.08 Id.
10Id.
n0 See supra Part I.
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TABLE 1. RELATIVE WILLINGNESS TO PART WITH
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS.
Average FMV of Donated
AGI Easement is X Percent Higher
than Average FMV of Donated
Real Estate
Under $200,000 187
$200,000 to $500,000 369
$500,000 to $1,000,000 188
$1,000,000 to $1,500,000 314
$1,500,000 to $2,000,000 128
$2,000,000 to $5,000,000 122
$5,000,000 to $10,000,000 198
More than $10,000,000 223
It is clear from the data in Table 1 that wealth does not explain donated-
easement generosity.
2. The Desire to Make Large, Single Gifts
One might argue that the data in Table 1 does not prove that donors are
more willing to part with easements than with real property. Because IRS
data does not reveal the total charitable donations made by individuals who
give away particular types of property, it could be that land donors typically
give away four parcels at a time, while easement donors prefer to make large
gifts of one piece of property. If this were true, it would mean - given the
numbers in Table 1 - that donors were more willing to part with real prop-
erty than with conservation easements.
Statistical analysis shows that this scenario is very unlikely. Using the
$200,000 to $500,000 AGI group as an example, one can compare the aver-
age value of a donated easement, or about $388,000,111 to the average annual
charitable contribution of donors within that group, or about $7,900.112
Based upon standard deviations, and assuming a normal distribution, we can
say that 99.8 percent of all included returns show annual contributions of
less than $8,500."1 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that when a donor in
". Tables of Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions (Data on file with Author).
112 Average computed from data in Table 2.2 for tax years 2003-2006 of Internal Revenue
Serv., SOI Tax Stats-Individual Tax Returns Publication 1304 (Complete Report), available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/O,,id= 134951,00.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2010).




this AGI group contributes an average chunk of real estate ($105,000), con-
servation easement ($388,000), or even securities ($12,600), that donation
likely represents her entire charitable donation for the year. If that is true,
and the pattern exists across time, then one may conclude that charitable
donors are much more willing to part with conservation easements than with
other types of property.
B. Benefits and Costs of Donating Easements
If donor characteristics cannot explain high willingness to part with
easements, perhaps benefits and costs associated with donating easements
can explain the phenomenon. The decision to make a charitable donation
can be expressed as:
if Bnon-tax + V*MR > V + Ctrnsaction, then donate,
where Bnon-tax represents the value to the donor of pure and impure altruism
114
as well as the value of other possible non-tax benefits, V represents the value
of the property, and MR is the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. V*MR is the
dollar value of the tax benefit granted to the donor by Congress."' On the
right side of the inequality are the costs of donating. In addition to the value
of the gift, the donor must also take into account transaction costs (CIransac-
non)), such as the cost of searching for a donor, the cost of negotiating the
terms of the donation, and the cost of hiring lawyers and appraisers."
6
Is it possible that - compared to other types of property - the tax or
non-tax benefits associated with donating conservation easements are partic-
ularly high or that the costs of donating are especially low?
1. Generating Artificially High Tax Benefits by Overstating Fair
Market Value
As with other kinds of not-readily valued property, the price of a con-
servation easement for tax purposes is based on an appraisal."' Because the
tax benefit of donating property to a charity is a product of the value of the
1
14 See infra note 133.
"s This is admittedly an oversimplification. First, a donor may not be able to deduct the
full fair market value of property. For example, if sale of the donated property would have
generated ordinary income, then the number used to calculate the deductible amount would be
the donor's basis in the property. Second, the donor may be limited in the extent to which he
can use the deduction to reduce current income, either because of statutory limitations or lack
of sufficient income. Finally, tax benefits may include benefits other than income tax benefits,
such as estate or property tax benefits. These issues should not affect the usefulness of the
model.
116 For a good description of the process of creating and donating a conservation easement
see EuzABETH BYERS AND KARIN MARCHETTI PoNTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HAND-
BOOK 43-68, 80-99 (2d ed. 2005). See also Open Space Institute, Land Conservation at OSI,
www.osiny.org/site/DocServer/ConservationEasements2.pdfdoclD= 1
2 2 (last visited Jan. 22,
2010).
" 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)( 1) (2006).
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property and the donor's marginal tax rate,"' that value is a critical variable
in the decision to donate.
The IRS and other observers have expressed concern that the realm of
conservation easement donation is characterized by an extraordinary amount
of negligent or intentional overvaluation. As a report issued by the Joint
Committee on Taxation explains:
Charitable deductions of qualified conservation contributions,
including conservation and fagade easements, present serious pol-
icy and compliance issues. Valuation is especially problematic be-
cause the measure of the deduction (i.e., generally the difference in
fair market value before and after placing the restriction on the
property) is highly speculative, considering that, in general, there
is no market and thus no comparable sales data for such
easements.1'
The "before and after" method of estimating FMV for tax purposes
means that there are actually two different ways an appraiser might overstate
the FMV of the easement. An easement might be overvalued by inflation of
the underlying property's "before value" or by understatement of its "after
value." 2 0 An aggressive appraiser would find comfort in the fact that, due
to the uncertainty surrounding estimates of value, the IRS will have a diffi-
cult time challenging the appraisal in court.'2'
There is some empirical evidence that substantial overstatement of
FMV does occur in the easement donation context.12 2 Nonetheless, the
"widespread overvaluation" hypothesis is not particularly appealing. Be-
cause the number with which we are concerned is the average value of
nearly 14,000 easements, overstatement would have to be present in a very
large number of cases in order for it to be a significant factor.123 Moreover,
"" The dollar amount of the tax benefit is expressed as V*MR in the decision-to-donate
model above. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
"' STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 40, at 281. See also Steven
T. Miller, Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities, Remarks before the Spring
Public Lands Conference in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 28, 2006); supra Part H.B.3.
120 Assume, for example, that the range of estimates of "before value" is $100 to $110,
and that the range of estimates for the "after value" is $10 to $20. Use of the before and after
estimates of $110 and $10, respectively, results in an estimate of easement FMV ($100) that is
$20 greater than an FMV estimate calculated using before and after estimates of $100 and $20,
respectively.
121 This is especially true with respect to "after" values. See supra Part II.B.3. A survey
of recent cases in which the IRS has challenged easement valuation reveals that the IRS's
challenge is usually focused on the estimate of "before" value.
122 See Gisler, supra note 67, at 1137-44; Tax Code Issues and Land Conservation: Hear-
ing Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Burnet R.
Maybank, III, Director, S.C. Dep't of Revenue) (describing several discovered instances of
conservation easement valuations which "shock the conscience"); Joe Stephens & David B.
Ottaway, Conservation Easements: Developers Find Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2003, at Al.




obvious and intentional overvaluation would require the complicity of the
taxpayer, the qualified appraiser, and the donee.12 4
Although the opportunity for overvaluation is a possible explanation for
high willingness to part, it seems fair to assume that the majority of fair
market value estimates for donated easements are calculated in good faith.'25
And, as shown in Part IV below, the valuation issues are ultimately secon-
dary: the design of the Section 170(h) program is inherently flawed and
would produce inefficient results even in the absence of fair market value
overstatements.
2. Unique Tax Benefits
Another possibility is that easement donations give rise to tax benefits
that other property donations do not.126 It is true that, while all qualifying
charitable donations are deductible against income, annual limitations on de-
ductions for easement donations have, in recent years, been less restrictive
than for other kinds of property.127 In addition, other types of tax benefits,
e.g., estate tax deductions 28 and reductions in state income or property
taxes,129 are potentially available to easement donors.
Due to a lack of needed data, this is a difficult hypothesis to test.130 We
can say for certain, though, that the more generous annual limitations on
easement deductions did not inflate values for tax years 2003 through 2005;
these rules did not come into effect until 2006.11 In order to estimate how
valuable estate tax deductions might be to donors, one would need data on
the extent to which they might ultimately be liable for estate taxes.1
32
1" See supra note 70.
125 According to Burnet Maybank, Hl, who led an audit of conservation easements granted
in South Carolina from 2001-2003, "the percentage of abuses [discovered] have [sic] been
quite small." Maybank Testimony, supra note 122, at 1.
126 All donors of appreciated property, where the appreciation can be characterized as
long-term capital gain, receive a tax benefit in addition to the deduction against income. See
Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of
Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REv. 1, 2 (2002). Specifically, they never have to pay tax on the
appreciation. See id.
127 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2006) (removing the annual limits on the use of
deductions for easement donations for a limited time period).
128 26 U.S.C. § 2031(c) (2006).
129 There are 12 states that provide state tax benefits in the form of credits, some of which
are transferable. See Christen Linke Young, Conservation Easement Tax Credits in Environ-
mental Federalism, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 218, 219 (2008).
130 Although one might be able to formulate hypothetical situations, the data for statistical
analysis is not available. See Lindstrom, supra note 39 at 3 n.5 (describing a hypothetical
scenario in which "the combined [income and estate tax savings] ... amount to ... 106% of
the value of the easement donated").
11 Pension Protection Act of 2006, 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2006).
132 Through the end of 2009, decedents would have no estate tax liability if the value of
their gross estate was $3,500,000 or less. 26 U.S.C. § 2010(a), (c) (2006). Because of this
high limit, very few individuals are subject to the estate tax. For the tax year 2006, when the
taxable estate limit was $2 million, only .63 percent of decedents' estates were liable for estate
tax. Brian G. Raub, A Look at Estate Tax Returns Filed for Wealthy Decedents Since 2001,
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3. Unique Non-Tax Benefits
Non-tax benefits associated with easement donation could provide an-
other possible explanation for high willingness to part. Typical non-tax ben-
efits would include the value to the donor of contributing to social welfare or
of being a good citizen.'33 These benefits, though, inure to all charitable
donors, and there is no reason to believe that they are higher for all easement
donors.
Because of the unique nature of conservation easements, however, it is
possible that some donors do receive unusual non-tax benefits. The donated
conservation easement allows the donor post-gift use and enjoyment of the
underlying land. In addition to the right to continue living on the property,
owners also maintain a more symbolic connection to the land.13 4
In addition, easement donations provide a handy means of circum-
venting restrictions that would limit an owner's ability to control use of the
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Fall 2009, 302; INTERNAL REV-
ENUE SERV., INTRODUCTION To ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES 950, 5 (2009).
133 These are known as "pure" and "impure" altruism. Pure altruism benefits are the
value to the donor of increasing the amount of public good provided by the particular charity.
See Lise Vesterlund, Why do People Give?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK 568, 571-72 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2006). "Impure altruism"
benefits include the value to the donor of recognition as a charitable individual, status in the
community, the ability to develop social and business connections, and less tangible benefits
such as the good feeling one obtains through donating to a worthy cause. See id. at 572-73.
See also James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464 (1990); William T. Harbaugh, The Prestige Motive for
Making Charitable Transfers, 88 A.E.A. Papers and Proc. 277, 277 (1998) (distinguishing
benefits that are "purely internal, derived from the donor's own knowledge of what he has
given, and those the donor only gets when other people know how much he has given").
13 It is interesting to consider the unique connection between property and the expression
of values. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, the Supreme Court described the difference between
expression and real-property-based expression:
Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct
from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by
other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information
about the identity of the "speaker." As an early and eminent student of rhetoric
observed, the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to
persuade. A sign advocating "Peace in the Gulf' in the front lawn of a retired
general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same
sign in a 10-year-old child's bedroom window or the same message on a bumper
sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of socialism may carry different impli-
cations when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than when pasted on a
factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board.
512 U.S. 43 (1994).
In addition, a conservation easement might symbolize far more important values. For exam-
ple, in a rural farming community, the donation of an easement could send messages to the
effect that "I'm proud to be a farmer," "I'm in this for the long haul," "I value our traditional
way of life more than I value money," or, along the same lines, "I would never sell my land to
rapacious developers." For case studies exploring the relationship between rural communities
and conservation easements, see Morrisette, supra note 11 at 396-418.
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property after her death.'35 Many easement donors express concern about
how future generations will use their land.136
It is hard to imagine that either continued use or dead-hand control
could account for donated-easement generosity. If the goal of easement do-
nors is to obtain public recognition for their contributions to conservation,
there are ways to do this that would be far more visible. A donor could, for
example, donate the land to a county or city for use as "[Donor]'s Park" or
"[Donor]'s Nature Preserve." Moreover, a significant number of easements
do not permit public access to the property; that is, many donors intention-
ally restrict the public's ability to learn about and enjoy the benefits of the
gift.'13 As to dead-hand control, there are other ways that a donor might
achieve this control at much lower cost. A donor could, for example, place
the land into a trust that restricted use of the property.' 8 In addition, the
future value of restrictions to a living donor would have to be discounted,
perhaps substantially.13 9
4. Unusually Low Transaction Costs
A donor will have more incentive to donate a piece of property where,
all other things being equal, the transaction costs associated with donating it
are lower. In addition, if it is difficult to find an organization willing and
able to accept a donation, donors may make a property donation of lesser
value. In effect, a donor may reduce the amount of her donation to account
for the time she spent looking for an organization that would accept her
donation.
The problem with this hypothesis is that the transaction costs associated
with donating easements are probably higher than they are for any other kind
of property. As described in Part II.B of this Article, federal tax law only
allows easement donors to take deductions for donations made to "qualified
organizations." 40 That organization must be willing and able to accept the
donation. Once the donor has located a willing donee, she will usually
spend time, and possibly attorney's fees, negotiating the terms of the ease-
1 See Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future,
88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the
Choices of Future Generations, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 601 (2004).
36 See McLaughlin, supra note 19, at 46 ("[T]he desire to exercise 'dead hand' control
over family decision-making" is one of the "less flattering non-tax factors that may motivate
easement donations.").
"' A recent study indicates that about 60 percent of easements held by land trusts do not
permit public access; the data do not discern between donated easements and easements pur-
chased by land trusts. Katherine Lieberknecht, Public Access to U.S. Conservation Land Trust
Properties, 75 J. AM. PLAN. AssN. 479, 482 (2009). One would intuit that the latter type
would more frequently allow for public access because of the fact that the landowner received
greater financial compensation for the easement.
38 Even if the duration of the restrictions were limited by the Rule Against Perpetuities,
the landowner could retain control of the property for a significant amount of time after her
death: a generation plus 21 years. See SINGER, supra note 13, at 333-36.
' See Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REv. 567, 583 (2003).
14 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(B) (2006).
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ment with that donee. Finally, if she wants a federal tax deduction, she will
have to pay an appraiser.141
IV. THE BEST HYPOTHESIS?
The best explanation for high willingness to part requires revisiting our
model,
if Bon.,, + V*MR > V + Cnnsaction, then donate.
This model assumes that V is the same on both sides of the inequality.
In other words, it assumes that the donor's cost in parting with the property
is identical to the property value upon which the tax benefit is based. Part
IV, among other things, explains why this assumption is flawed.
A more accurate depiction of the model, when not-readily valued prop-
erty is involved, would be:
if Bnon-tax + FMV*MR > Cpaning + Ctransaction, then donate.
Again, Bnost represents the value to the donor of non-tax benefits. FMV is
the appraised fair market value of the not-readily valued property and MR is
the taxpayer's marginal rate. On the right side of the inequality are the costs
of donating. Cparing represents what I call "parting cost" and Ctransaction repre-
sents transaction costs. Parting cost is the value of the donated cash or prop-
erty to the donor. In the case of cash, the parting cost will be equal to the
amount of cash donated. In other words, the ratio of Cparting/FMV will be 1.
In order to understand how parting cost - or more specifically, the
difference between parting cost and fair market value - affects a donor's
incentives, consider a charitable donor, June. Assume that June wants to
give $5 to charity. She has a five-dollar bill and an old pair of pants with a
fair market value of $5. June has not worn the pants for years and does not
plan to wear them again. If June gives away the five-dollar bill and is sub-
ject to a 30 percent tax rate, she will be $3.50 poorer after her donation,
recapturing $1.50 through the tax benefit.142 On the other hand, because she
places a very low subjective value on the pants, June will be better off mak-
ing her $5 donation in the form of those pants. Depending on the marginal
tax rate, and on the relationship between June's subjective valuation and fair
market value, June may actually be wealthier after she donates the pants to
charity. If, for example, she would have accepted a buyer's offer of $.50 for
the pants, and her marginal rate is 30 percent, June's charitable donation nets
"' Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(B) (1996).
142 This figure does not include the non-tax benefits June may have received from making
a charitable donation. See Vesterlund, supra note 133 and accompanying text. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that these would be the same whether she donated cash or pants.
74 [Vol. 35
Eagle, Notional Generosity
her $1 of new wealth.143 June can take advantage of the spread between fair
market value and her low parting cost.
If June had simply sold the pants for $5, we would call her a savvy
businessperson. Allowing June to exploit the subjective-value spread in the
context of a charitable donation, however, represents a bad deal for taxpay-
ers, to the tune of $1 of lost tax revenue: June would have donated the pants
- creating the same public benefit - in exchange for a tax benefit of only
$.50.
One might ask: why would June accept $1 in profit when she could
have received $5 from selling her pants on the open market? For one thing,
simply because the pants have a fair market value of $5 does not mean that
June could have obtained this amount in a transaction. The amount she re-
ceived would be determined, in part, by her negotiating skills. In addition,
selling entails some transaction costs, such as advertising and the time spent
driving to a used clothes store. Finally, it could be that the combination of
the $1 profit and the non-tax benefits she receives from making a charitable
donation exceed $5.
Unlike June, potential easement owners do not have the option to sell.
They could, of course, sell the entire property, but this would mean that they
would no longer be able to use it. Thus, the subjective-value spread is the
critical factor in understanding the incentives of easement donors.
The opportunity to capitalize on that spread, through what might be
called "donative arbitrage," inheres in donations of all types of not-readily
valued property. For two reasons, large spreads are likely to be common in
the realm of conservation easement donations. First, a negative partial inter-
est donation allows a donor to give away specific property rights to which he
attaches little subjective value but that have high market value, while at the
same time retaining the rights she values most. Second, the flexible nature
of conservation easements allows a donor to tailor easement terms so that
she can keep those use or development rights she values most. Large
spreads mean that the effective cost to the donor of each donated fair market
dollar's worth of easement is extremely low.
A. The Subjective-Value Spread
In the case of not-readily valued property, as noted above, FMV will
not always equal Caing. The reason is that, unlike cash, the value of prop-
erty is subjective.144 But for this fact, sales of property would not occur. For
example, June would not pay $10,000 for a car unless that car was worth at
least $10,000 to her. The seller would not accept $10,000 unless the car was
143 The pants were worth $.50 to her, but the tax benefit was worth $1.50 ($5 of FMV *
30% marginal tax rate). This assumes June has income against which she can apply the chari-
table deduction, and that she itemizes her deductions.
'" See Timothy J. Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Rele-
vance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL SruD. 379 (1983).
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worth $9,999 (or less) to him. However, to say value is subjective is not to
say that it is irrational. In other words, when June offers $10,000 for the car,
she does not necessarily do that because she likes the car more than the
seller does. Instead, June may be able to put the car to a more profitable use
than the seller can.145
Unlike a sale, a charitable contribution of property does not generate
any information about the subjective value of the property to the donor. It is
possible, if not highly likely, that the donor's subjective valuation of the
property will differ from the appraiser's estimate of fair market value.
In some cases, the donor's subjective valuation will be greater than the
fair market value estimate. This would be the case whenever the property is
uniquely valuable to the donor, as when, for example, it is her long-time
residence. In this scenario, if the donor were considering giving his home to
charity, the ratio of Cpaning/FMV would be greater than 1. In other words, if
her home has a fair market value of $200,000, she would be better off giving
away $200,000 cash than giving away her home.146
In other cases, the donor's subjective valuation will be less than the fair
market value estimate. For example, June, the donor described above, values
her pants at $.50, while the estimated fair market value is $5. Unlike the
donor described in the preceding paragraph, June would be better off donat-
ing her property than her cash: the ratio of Cpaing/FMV in that case would be
less than 1.
This example illustrates why, in certain cases, a donor would prefer to
donate property with a fair market value of $5 rather than $5 cash and, in
other cases, she would prefer the opposite. It is also easy to see why a
particular donor who owned two pieces of property with the same fair mar-
ket value might prefer to donate one rather than the other. June, for exam-
ple, might own two pairs of pants, each with a fair market value of $5, but
with different parting costs. For example, she might be willing to sell the
pair she never wears for $.50, but she would not accept less than $4 for the
pair she wears once a week. If she wishes to give $5 to charity, she will
donate the former pair because the costs of donating that pair are lower.
B. Partial Interests and Subjective Value
In order to explain the data illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1, it
is necessary to explain why donors might usually prefer to donate one kind
of property rather than another, that is, prefer to part with $1 worth of con-
servation easement FMV rather than $1 worth of real estate FMV. The ex-
145 For an excellent discussion of subjective value and real property see Katrina Miriam
Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 239, 262-72 (2007).
146 This is the reason why property owners, and residential property owners in particular,
would believe that the compensation offered them in eminent domain cases is inadequate. See
Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of Future Interests: Empirical
Evidence of the Failure of Fair Market Value, 1989 BYU L. REV. 789 (1989).
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planation is partially rooted, as Daniel Halperin suggested,147 in the unique
partial-interest problem created by allowing deductions for the donation of
negative interests in property.
In order to understand the power of a negative interest deduction vis-a-
vis parting cost, imagine that the tax law allowed a deduction for the charita-
ble donation of a negative easement on any kind of real or personal property.
Further imagine that the deductible value of such easements would be the
net present value of the use rights given away. Under these rules, a donor
could donate a negative easement that prevented her, or any other person,
from using any of her property "whenever I am not using it myself." The
donor would receive a deduction for all of her property, minus some small
amount to account for the time during which she would actually use it in the
future. She would receive this deduction with absolutely no parting cost.148
The tax law governing conservation easement deductions is not, of
course, so generous. However, the example does serve to illustrate the key
point: to the extent that a conservation easement donor succeeds in aligning
the restrictions contained in the easement with her desired use of the prop-
erty, she can generate a very large and profitable spread between the fair
market value of the easement and her parting cost.
Two different aspects of Section 170(h) allow conservation easement
donors to take advantage of, and then manipulate, the subjective-value
spread.
1. Splitting the Right to Use and Enjoy
Property consists of a "bundle of rights," including the right to exclude,
the right to alienate, and the right to use and enjoy.149 These are rights, not
obligations. In other words, a landowner has the option to exclude or in-
clude whomever she wants, the option to sell or give away the property, and
147 See Halperin Testimony, supra note 55.
148 Allowing deductions for donations of negative interests is both more and less problem-
atic than allowing deductions for donations of affirmative interests, such as rights of way. On
the one hand, the donor of an affirmative easement would face potential costs coterminous
with the easement holder's actual, eventual use of the easement. A substantial amount of use
might interfere with the landowner's own use of the land subject to the right of way. On the
other hand, a landowner might donate the same right of way thousands of times, thus earning
deductions that might exceed the fair market value of the entire property. If these were care-
fully donated, for example, to charitable organizations located on the other side of the country,
the donor would incur very low parting costs. The law does not permit deductions for dona-
tions of affirmative interests, such as rights of way. See, e.g., Logan v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M.
(CCH) 658 (1994); Stjernholm v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 389 (1989).
1 Merrill describes the "bundle of rights" view of property as nominalism, insofar as it
emphasizes the possibility that bundles may be composed of nearly unlimited combinations of
rights. He distinguishes this from what he calls "multiple-variable essentialism," which views
the right to exclude, the right to alienate, and the right to use and enjoy (along with other
derivative rights) as necessary elements of "property." Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 736-39 (1998).
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the option to use and enjoy the property in any (legal, non-nuisance) manner
that she chooses.150
Few, if any, property owners actively exercise all of these rights to their
full extent and on a constant basis. Something close to full advantage is
taken of some rights, such as the right to dispose of one's property and the
right to exclude. However, property owners will rarely exercise the right to
use and enjoy to its fullest potential because it encompasses so many
possibilities.'
More importantly, the very purpose of legal recognition of the right to
use and enjoy property is to ensure that landowners have the right not merely
to exercise the right, but to exercise it in any lawful way that they choose.'52
Section 170(h) provides landowners with a financial reward for exercising
the right to use and enjoy their property as long as this use and enjoyment
does not include extensive commercial development. In other words, the
strongest effect of conservation easements may not be to limit an individual
landowner's right to use and enjoy the land, but rather to endorse specific
uses of the land.'
Furthermore, the economics literature is replete with studies indicating
that landowners place a high value on land used in the way encouraged by
conservation easement subsidies.'" So-called "hedonic value" studies show
that landowners are willing to pay significantly more for properties that con-
tain relatively natural habitat and scenic amenities. 5 Moreover, many stud-
ies show that people are also willing to pay significant amounts in order to
o5 0 Id. at 739 ("[T]he general concept of private property [is based on] the understanding
that, 'in the case of each object, the individual person whose name is attached to that object is
to determine how the object shall be used and by whom.'") (quoting Jeremy Waldron, What is
Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUo. 313, 327 (1985)).
'5' It is easy to think of examples. June owns at least two pairs of pants, and she cannot
wear each of them every waking moment. A drive down almost any residential street will
reveal homes that are smaller than permitted under the zoning ordinance. The common law
developed the doctrine of adverse possession, in part, to encourage property owners to make
some minimal use of their property. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in
American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 573-74 (1996). The development of the
doctrine provides some evidence that landowners have often chosen not to make any use of
their property.
152 See Merrill, supra note 149, at 739.
'1 Among other things, conservation easements might allow owners to protect land that
they choose not to develop from adverse possession claims. Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse
Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 283, 308-09 (2006).
'5 See, e.g., CHRIS T. BASTIAN ET AL., Environmental Amenities and Agricultural Land
Values: A Hedonic Model Using Geographic Information Systems Data, 40 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 337, 346 (2002) ("[R]emote agricultural lands, which include wildlife habitat, angling
opportunities and scenic vistas, command higher prices per acre than those which primarily
possess agricultural production capacity."); SANCHITA SENGUPrA & DANIEL EDWARD Os-
GOOD, The Value of Remoteness: A Hedonic Estimation of Ranchette Prices, 44 ECOLOGICAL
EcoN. 91, 102 (2003) ("[On-parcel] [s]cenic amenities were found to have a powerful influ-
ence on ranchette values . . .").
"55 See Stephanie A. Snyder et al., Influence of Purchaser Perceptions and Intentions on
Price for Forest Land Parcels: A Hedonic Pricing Approach, 14 J. FOREST EcON. 47, 62
(2008):
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have on-parcel access to recreational activities such as hiking, wildlife
watching, all-terrain vehicle use, and hunting.156
As demonstrated above, section 170(h) is premised on two faulty as-
sumptions: that the right to use and enjoy property in these ways is value-
less, and that the right to use and enjoy property for extensive use or
development is objectively the most important kind of right to use and
enjoy.157
This is yet another way to view the "partial interest problem" created
by deductions for conservation easement donations. These deductions allow
landowners to donate restrictions on only part of their right to use and enjoy.
The problem is that the program is most appealing to those taxpayers who
value the right to use and enjoy their property in relatively undeveloped
form, and least appealing to those who prefer to use and enjoy for more
intensive, commercial development.'58 As an official from The Nature Con-
servancy ("TNC") explained in a 1999 interview:
[L]andowners understand what they are trying to accomplish by
placing their land under a conservation easement; most landown-
ers have no intention of developing their property . . . the conser-
vation easement program sells itself; landowners come to TNC to
donate easements.'59
The variable describing the buyer's intention to build either a primary or secondary
home on the parcel proved to have a very large, positive influence over sale price per
hectare. Buyers paid 41% more per hectare on average if they had plans to build a
residence on the parcel over those who had other intended purposes or uses, a pre-
mium of $988/ha. Those purchasers who responded that their primary reason for
purchase was to own a place in which to enjoy wildlife paid a premium of $631/ha.
The positive influence of the wildlife variable might be indicative of the purchasers'
desire for hunting or bird watching on the parcel and reflective of the premium they
are willing to pay to enjoy such recreational opportunities on private land.
In this study, purchasers' intentions to subdivide, sell, or harvest timber from the property may
not have been significant factors in their willingness to pay for land. Id. at 70; see also,
Cynthia J. Nickerson & Lori Lynch, The Effect of Farmland Preservation Programs on Farm-
land Prices, 83 Am. J. AGRIC. EcON. 341, 341-42 (2001) (finding conservation easement re-
strictions did not significantly affect land prices, perhaps because "land buyers may buy
preserved farm parcels as hobby farms . . . because they receive non-market values (uncon-
nected to agriculture) from owning land in an agricultural area that is more likely to retain its
rural character and open space."); Echeverria, supra note 40, at 35 (referring to anecdotal
evidence that conservation easements do not necessarily adversely affect land values).
156 See, e.g., John S. Baen, The Growing Importance and Value Implications of Recrea-
tional Hunting Leases to Agricultural Land Investors, 14 J. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 399, 400
(1997) ("The widespread use of hunting leases in the South and southwestern U.S. is perhaps
the best measure of the growth and 'market value' of recreational leases . . . . In Texas,
'hunting lease' income often far exceeds agricultural income and therefore 'recreational' use
becomes by definition the highest and best use of the land .... ); Jason Henderson & Sean
Moore, The Capitalization of Wildlife Recreation Income into Farmland Values, 38 J. AGRIC.
& APPLIED EcON. 597 (2006).
1 Ironically, the easement subsidy program may thus provide further evidence for what




1 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 40, at 284.
' Morrisette, supra note 11, at 413.
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To a landowner who prefers to use and enjoy her property in relatively
undeveloped form, the parting cost of making a charitable donation of re-
strictions on development will be very low. Certainly, it will be much lower
than the cost of parting with the property in its entirety, which would entail
losing the rights she values most.
One might argue that landowners who donated conservation easements
were in the process of changing their desires; perhaps they previously pre-
ferred to use and enjoy their property in undeveloped form but were on the
verge of deciding to use it for intensive commercial development. This is
not the case. First, landowners agree to at least some easements that do not
allow any new post-easement uses.'60 Second, easement donors give away
easements with values strikingly inconsistent with the values of other kinds
of property with which donors of similar income are willing to part.'6' Thus,
conservation easement donors act as if they are giving away something that
is of low value to them.
It is true that even a landowner whose interests align completely with
easement restrictions will pay a cost in the form of the lost option to change
her mind in the future. However, the true cost of the loss of this option will
vary, depending on the landowner and the discount rate she applies. This
cost may also be offset by the value of the right to prevent others from
developing the property in the future. Moreover, as discussed below, the
donor is not required to fully relinquish her right to change her mind in the
future. A landowner can temper her risk by preserving the right to change
her mind through easement terms that allow new, future uses. If, for exam-
ple, she falls on hard times and needs to squeeze some additional value out
of the property, the easement might allow her to do this. Furthermore, it
may well be that landowners substantially discount this risk through their,
perhaps mistaken, belief that the easement restrictions can later be
removed.'62
Finally, assuming perfect information were available, one could make a
good argument that a landowner should not deduct the value of the easement
until she actually does change her mind, because it is only then that she has
made a gift to charity.163
2. Ratcheting Up the Spread
In addition to allowing landowners to obtain donations for giving up
rights they do not plan to use and enjoy, Section 170(h) provides a mecha-
'o The "exclusively for conservation purposes" regulations would permit new post-ease-
ment uses in nearly every case. See supra text accompanying notes 84-95.
16 See supra Figure 2.
162 See Nickerson & Lynch, supra note 155.
163 Cf Bennett v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1991 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 651, *18
(1991) ("Therefore, since petitioner failed in 1982 to execute a valid deed of gift or to effect
real delivery of the piano to the college and continued to possess, use, and enjoy it until 1985,
no gift of the piano to the college occurred in 1982.").
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nism for landowners to minimize parting costs by retaining those future de-
velopment rights with the highest marginal subjective value.
Recall that the "exclusively for conservation purposes" regulations al-
low the donor and the land trust to lift restrictions on some amount of new
and inconsistent post-easement uses.M These regulations permit the land-
owner to take the most subjectively valuable components of her develop-
ment rights out of the donated bundle. Thus, for example, a donor might
retain the future right to build additional residences for family members,
build additional commercial buildings, or engage in a limited amount of resi-
dential development.' 65 The extent to which a landowner can retain such
options is limited only by the conservation purposes envelope described
above.166 As long as the property provides the public benefits specific to the
applicable conservation purpose, the "exclusively for conservation pur-
poses" regulations allow incursions into that purpose.'16
It is true that if the "after" estimate accurately accounts for the fair
market value of the post-easement uses permitted by the terms of the ease-
ment, then the landowner will have to pay for them. Each fair market value
dollar of permitted post-easement use should reduce the fair market value of
the easement by one dollar, thus reducing the amount of the available
deduction.
Even though the landowner will have to pay for the retained rights, this
may still prove to be a very good deal for the landowner. First, the land-
owner will only pay an amount equal to the product of the retained rights
and her marginal rate for the fair market value of those rights.168 More im-
portant, if a taxpayer can cherry-pick rights to retain, she will choose those
with the highest subjective marginal value.169 In other words, she will sort
the rights most valuable to her into the "keep" basket and put the rest into
the "donate" bin.
To be clear, this does not mean that the donated use rights do not have
value to another person, or that the easement does not provide conservation
value. What it means is that the donor can donate many fair market value
dollars of property at a very low parting cost.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
165 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
'66 See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
167 Id.
'6 For example, increasing the "after" value of the property from $1 to $2 will reduce the
fair market value of the easement by $1, and will thus reduce the amount of tax benefit by the
product of $1 and the taxpayer's marginal rate.
169 The landowner's subjective valuation of possible future uses will vary. She might, for
example, care more about retaining the ability to build an extra home for her daughter than the
right to build a second barn, even where each added the same amount of fair market value to
the property.
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C. Why It Matters
As seen in the example of June and her jeans,17 0 large subjective-value
spreads create not only opportunities for donors, but also inefficiencies for
the government in its efforts to acquire property that provides public bene-
fits. In the case of $5 jeans with a $.50 parting cost, the amount of ineffi-
ciency ($1) is relatively insignificant. In the case of $500,000 easements, on
the other hand, the inefficiencies are potentially very significant.
Of course, we cannot know easement donors' parting costs in the ab-
sence of a transaction. However, if we assume that real generosity (the will-
ingness to accept parting costs in exchange for the benefits associated with
charitable giving) is relatively constant across income groups, we can see
from looking at Figure 2 that easement values far exceed the norm. Using
the $500,000 to $1,000,000 AGI group as an example, and taking donated
real estate values as the most conservative estimate of real generosity, the
inefficiencies associated with each donation would be in the range of several
hundred thousand dollars.
Overpaying for the public benefits created by conservation easements
reduces the amount that could be used to meet other conservation needs.
The total annual federal tax expenditure for conservation easements is in the
neighborhood of $590 million."' In comparison, direct federal spending for
"o See the introduction to Part IV supra for an introduction to this example.
... The IRS's data show that the total value of donated easements in 2003, 2004, 2005, and
2006 was $1.49 billion, $1.45 billion, $2.1 billion, and $1.75 billion, respectively. IRS 2006,
supra note 1, at 59; IRS 2007, supra note 1, at 78; IRS 2008, supra note 1, at 69; IRS 2009,
supra note 1, at 69. Multiplying the value of easement donations by a tax rate of 35 percent,
tax expenditures for easement subsidies over the four-year period averaged about $590 million
annually since the marginal tax rates for the years in question range between 28 percent and
39.6 percent. 26 U.S.C. § 1(a). The 35 percent figure I use in estimating expenditures reflects
an average of the 31 percent rate for income between $89,150 and $140,000 and the 39.6
percent rate for income over $250,000. Id. This approach to estimating tax expenditures has
been used before. See Komgold, supra note 23, at 1057.
It should be noted that, while a taxpayer reports the full value of the donated property in the
year the property is donated, the tax benefit may accrue over a multi-year period due to annual
limitations on the extent to which the deduction may be used against income. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(E) (2006). Because taxpayers may only carry deductions related to the contribu-
tion of conservation easements forward for 15 years, § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii), some of the benefit
may never be realized. The extent to which deductions were actually carried forward beyond a
given year would reduce the expenditure cost for that year due to the fact that the cost of
related deductions in future years would be subject to discounting.
On the other hand, because of the rapid increase in easement donation levels, my estimate
may well understate the present level of tax expenditures. The number of acres in the United
States that are encumbered by non-historic preservation conservation easements doubled be-
tween 2000 and 2003. McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 49 (noting that number of acres encum-
bered, according to data collected by the Land Trust Alliance, rose from 2.5 million to 5
million between 2000 and 2003). The most recent data from the Land Trust Alliance show that
6.2 million acres were encumbered in 2005. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2005 NATIONAL LAND
TRUST CENSUS REPORT 5 (2006), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/
land-trust-census/2005-report.pdf. The Land Trust Alliance data do not include easements
donated to "national land trusts, such as The Nature Conservancy ..... McLaughlin, supra
note 16, at 51.
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the acquisition of wildlife habitat through easement or fee purchase is only
about $680 million.17 2 At the same time, conservation biologists estimate
that an effective federal habitat acquisition program would require many ad-
ditional billions of dollars annually."' Every tax dollar counts, especially
when spending is currently far short of what is needed.
Perhaps even more important than the overall inefficiency of easement
donations, the fact that parting costs undoubtedly vary among potential ease-
ment donors leads to a troubling conclusion.17 4 Assume that June owns two
pair of pants with a fair market value of $5, and that one pair is worth $.25 to
her and the other pair is worth $.50 to her. If the value of the tax benefit
generated by donating $5 of fair market value is $1.50, June will have more
incentive to donate the pants that are less valuable to her because she will
net $1.25 instead of $1. The same would be true if June owned one pair and
her sister May owned the other: whoever valued her jeans less would have
the greater incentive to donate.
Thus, in the conservation easement context, landowners who most pre-
fer to keep their land in its current condition (and who would thus give up
very little in agreeing to land-use restrictions) will be the most likely to
donate conservation easements. Because similar restrictions would be ex-
pensive to them, landowners who are most interested in developing their
property will be the least likely to donate. This is the opposite of an optimal
easement subsidy program, which would provide the greatest incentive to
the owner who was most likely to reduce the conservation value of her prop-
erty in the future.
V. IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES FOR
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Due to the overall shortage of funds available for conservation, it is
worth thinking about some ways in which the subsidy program might be
restructured to obtain more conservation for less money. There are two pos-
sible approaches, each of which carries some risk.
172 Jeff Lerner et al., What's in Noah's Wallet? Land Conservation Spending in the United
States, 57 BIOSCIENCE 419 (2007). In this study, Lerner et al. estimate total federal spending
on land conservation programs over a ten-year period, 1992 to 2001. The study covered 24
separate federal programs, split into four types: purchase of fee title interests, purchase of
conservation easements, "rental" programs (year-to-year subsidy programs, such as the Con-
servation Reserve Program), and cost share programs, through which the federal government
splits the cost of land conservation with a state. In the ten years covered by the study, the
federal government spent a total of $22.6 billion, or about $2.2 billion per year, through these
24 programs. Ignoring year-to-year habitat "leases," federal spending for permanent acquisi-
tions totaled about $6.8 billion over ten years, or about $680 million each year.
173 See Mark L. Shaffer et al., Noah's Options: Initial Cost Estimates of a National System
of Habitat Conservation Areas in the United States, 52 BIoSCIENcE 439, 441-2 (2002).
174 I will assume, probably erroneously, that the value of the unique non-tax benefits at-
tached to donating easements is constant across all easement donors. This assumption does not
affect the analysis of the effects of variable parting costs on donor incentives. If the non-tax
benefits varied in value, then this variation would have similar effects on those incentives.
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The first approach is to require that the acquisition of conservation
easements be conducted in the form of an actual transaction. The source of
the current problem, from the perspective of the public treasury, is that Sec-
tion 170(h) allows a landowner to unilaterally condemn her development
rights, thereby fixing their value at the appraiser's "willing buyer, willing
seller" estimate."' If there were an actual buyer involved, she would be able
to negotiate a price somewhere between the conservation value of the ease-
ment and the landowner's parting cost. If she were a good negotiator, she
would be able to pay just slightly more than the landowner's parting cost.
A second approach would be to convert conservation easements into a
marketable form of property, that is, a commodity that could be bought and
sold. Under this approach, land restrictions could still be donated, but once
donated, the donee would be free to re-sell them to a party interested in
either protecting or developing the property.'76
A. The Joint Committee on Taxation's Proposals
Before discussing these two proposals, it is worth assessing two rele-
vant proposals made by the Joint Committee on Taxation in 2005.77 The
committee recommended that Congress eliminate the "charitable contribu-
" As mentioned above at note 146, the overpayment problem created by subjective-value
spread can be seen as an upside-down eminent domain problem, or perhaps, "Kelo's Re-
venge." Government's use of the eminent domain power can be controversial because it cap-
tures the surplus between the fair market value of the condemned property and the landowner's
subjective valuation. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent
Domain, 105 MICH. L. REv. 101, 104 (2006) ("The possibility that property owners may be
undercompensated in the eminent domain process is frequently cited in the literature discuss-
ing the public use problem."). One rationale for the use of fair market value as the measure of
compensation in eminent domain cases is that it prevents the landowner from exploiting bilat-
eral monopoly scenarios, e.g., where the landowner owns the last parcel needed to complete a
railroad. Id. at 107. In the case of conservation easement donations, on the other hand, it is
the landowner who has the power to decide when condemning some amount of her develop-
ment rights, for FMV*MR, is in her best interests.
"6 Another theoretically possible, but practically difficult, means of reducing overpay-
ment would be for the IRS to deny deductions in cases where the subjective-value spread was
too great. In McLennan v. United States, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the IRS had denied
the McLennans' deduction for a donated conservation easement; the McLennans paid the re-
sulting tax and sued for a refund. At trial, the IRS argued that the McLennans lacked the
requisite donative intent because, in crafting the terms of the easement, they were "motivated
to maintain their property values and also obtain a tax deduction . . . ." Id. at 840-41. (Dona-
tive intent is a required element of any deductible charitable donation. Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d
500, 502 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113 (1989).) In other words, the IRS argued
that the McLennans did not part with subjective value, pointing to provisions in the donated
easement that gave the landowners:
1. the right to subdivide the easement property into eight parcels;
2. an unrestricted right to build four new family residences and roads to these residences;
3. the right to cut timber to accommodate the residential structures; and
4. the right to farm portions of the property.
McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 104 (1991).
Neither this argument nor the government prevailed.
"' See STAFF OF THE JoIr COMmiTTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 40, at 277-87.
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tion deduction[ I] for a contribution of a fagade easement ... that recently
has been or is being used, or is reasonably expected to be used, by the donor
or a family member as a personal residence (principal or otherwise)," and
for other conservation easements, "if the donor (or a family member of the
donor) has a right to use all or a portion of the real property as a personal
residence (principal or otherwise) at any time after the contribution."
78 The
committee also recommended that, in order "[t]o address the valuation con-
cern," the deduction for all contributions should be limited to 33 percent of
the fair market value of the donated easement.1
79
The "no personal residence property" proposal represents an attempt to
get at the problems created by the subjective-value spread. The underlying
idea is that a donor is less likely to be inclined to exercise her development
rights with regard to property on which she resides.s 0 In other words, her
parting costs are likely to be quite low.
The "33 percent limit" proposal is a rougher cut at the same issue. The
underlying idea here seems to be that donors appear to be overly willing to
part with fair market value, and thus there must be a problem somewhere in
the system. If Congress were to reduce the amount of the available deduc-
tion, then the financial impact of large spreads (and overvaluation) would be
reduced.'8 '
Each of these proposals fails to adequately address the problem of sub-
jective-value spread, and the latter might exacerbate some of the incentive
problems that plague the current regime. The "no personal residence prop-
erty" proposal is both over- and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive be-
cause some owners of residence property may actually be inclined to
develop that property in the near future. It is under-inclusive because own-
ers of non-residence property may desire and intend to keep the property in
its undeveloped condition for uses such as recreation, hunting, or mitigation
banking. The "33 percent of FMV" proposal would reduce the amount of
"7 Id. at 282-83.
179 Id. at 285-86.
Iso The staff's report argues that:
Whenever possible, tax incentives should be targeted to those persons who are most
likely to modify their behavior in substantial part because of the provision of the tax
benefit. Otherwise, providing such benefits constitutes a windfall rather than an in-
centive. The present charitable deduction regime for qualified conservation contri-
butions provides a windfall to those taxpayers who grant an easement or other
restriction to a qualified organization if the activity or use restricted by the easement
or restriction likely would never occur. For example, a person who purchases a
residence in a historic district that has homes that were designed and constructed in a
particular period and with a particular architectural style generally does not acquire
the home with the intention of altering the exterior of the building in a manner that
would be inconsistent with the neighboring structures. Similarly, a person who ac-
quires real property located by a nature preserve often is attracted to the area because
of the preserve, and in such cases would not alter or use the acquired property for a
purpose that would impede or contravene such preservation efforts.
Id. at 284.
'"' Id. at 285-87.
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overpayment in cases where parting costs were low. On the other hand, it
would reduce the incentives for landowners who desire to develop to donate.
Moreover, it would mean that only those donors with extraordinarily low
parting costs, that is, landowners least likely to develop, would be inclined to
make donations.
B. Creating Actual Buyer-Seller Transactions Using Cash Donations,
Government Grants, or Government Purchases
A more effective proposal, first made by the Department of Treasury
over 20 years ago,' would be to eliminate the deduction for the donation of
conservation easements and to replace it with subsidies or grants for the
direct purchase of those easements.'83
Under one approach, land trusts would rely on tax-deductible cash do-
nations from donors to fund the purchase of easements from landowners.'"
A second approach, which could be used in conjunction with the first, would
be for Congress to establish a grant-making institution that would make
grants to land trusts to be used for the purchase of easements. Congress
could fund this institution with an amount equivalent to the tax expenditures
saved by eliminating the deduction for easement donations. A third ap-
proach would be to use those same appropriations to add to funds used by
federal agencies to purchase easements from landowners.'
By inserting a buyer into the easement acquisition transaction, each of
these approaches would help reduce the extent to which the public overpays
for easements. The use of a buyer would result in a price more reflective of
the landowner's true parting cost. If, for example, the landowner truly had
no desire to develop, a buyer should be able to purchase the easement for
relatively low cost. Overall, inserting a buyer should enable the public to
acquire more easements for the $590 million that is now being spent through
foregone tax revenues.' 6
There are some potential risks involved in moving to this approach. If
the first model were adopted, it is possible that land trusts would have diffi-
culty raising necessary funds from private donors. The primary risk in using
182 DEP OF THE TkEASURY, supra note 40.
183 Even if the law were altered to prohibit donations of conservation easements, landown-
ers would still be free to donate their entire fee interest in the property, subject to a restriction
preventing alteration. As a donation of an entire interest in property, this would not raise the
same problems as donations of partial interests, such as conservation easements. Fee dona-
tions would result in at least the same amount of conservation value to the public and a greater
tax benefit to the donor, but fewer private benefits to the landowner.
' Cash donations to qualified non-profits are deductible. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006).
8 For a description of the many existing federal land and easement purchase programs,
see Lerner et al., supra note 172. It would be possible to provide landowners who sold ease-
ments under any of these models with what would perhaps be more efficient tax benefits:
Congress could exempt the sale of easements from federal tax, or it could allow the land-
owner's entire basis in the property to be applied in determining the amount of the gain from
the sale. A full analysis of the impacts of such measures is beyond the scope of this paper.186 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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the second two models, which depend upon Congressional appropriations, is
that Congress would not actually appropriate the funds. Forcing land trusts
to rely either on private donations or government grants would insert signifi-
cant financial unpredictability into the easement acquisition process.1
8 7
In addition to these risks, it is possible that both the grant-driven and
direct government purchase model would add new transaction costs to the
process, thereby reducing the amount of money available for easement ac-
quisition. Land trusts would be required to devote resources to grant appli-
cations, and the grant-making institution would have to create a system for
processing them.
On the other hand, as Professor Korngold has noted, these approaches
might add benefits insofar as they move subsidized easement acquisition
toward a more coordinated model.' 8 Rather than accepting easements on an
ad hoc basis, land trusts or the government could focus on acquiring ease-
ments in a particular area or meant to protect specific kinds of habitat."'
Moreover, the insertion of a buyer would also address what might be
called the "public-benefit problem." The "before and after" valuation
method estimates the value of lost development rights; this estimate sets the
amount of the tax expenditure. However, the value that the public receives
for this expenditure is not necessarily correlated to the value of the develop-
ment rights. Rather, the public benefit is related to the ecological or aes-
thetic value of protecting the land from development.'" A piece of land
could have high conservation value and low development value or, in the
alternative, it could possess low conservation value and high development
value. Unfortunately for the taxpayers, they will forego a substantial amount
of tax revenue in protecting the latter parcel. The insertion of a buyer should
address this problem.191 Assuming that land trust buyers are both knowl-
edgeable about and interested in conservation, the amount they would be
willing to pay for a particular easement should be based on the extent to
which it provides conservation benefits.192
187 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Federal Recreational
Land Policy: The Rise and Decline of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 9 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 125, 162-172 (1983-1984) (noting that, while Congress has appropriated funds for
land acquisition on a fairly consistent basis, the Department of Interior has not consistently
used them for that purpose).
1' See Komgold, supra note 23, at 1059-60, 1068-70.
189 Id.
" One could argue that the conservation value and development value are correlated
because high development value would indicate an impending threat to the conservation value
of the land. But this would only be true where the property actually had some conservation
value.
" The insertion of a buyer would also address overpayments related to, for example,
unique non-tax benefits that the donor would obtain through donation. To the extent that the
donor believes he will receive some community recognition from creating the easement, it
would reduce the amount he was willing to accept for parting with it.
192 Of course, the landowner's starting point in negotiations would be the value of the
development rights. However, given that this value may be speculative in many cases, a savvy
buyer should be able to capture some of the difference between the conservation value and the
development value of the property.
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C. Converting Conservation Easements to Development Rights
A third, perhaps more radical, proposal would entail the conversion of
what are now called conservation easements into another form of property
known as "development rights." Under this approach, as under the current
system, a landowner could donate his development rights to a land trust and
take a deduction equal to their fair market value. In addition to donating the
development rights, the landowner would be required to donate an option to
purchase the underlying land for the "after" value used in the appraisal of
the development rights.193 After the donation, the land trust would be free -
as other charitable recipients of donated property currently are - to exercise
the option, combine the underlying land with the development rights it
holds,194 and then sell the fee interest to a willing buyer. Land trusts would
be required to use the proceeds from those sales to fund the purchase of
other easements. In the alternative, a land trust could opt to hold the devel-
opment rights forever.
From the taxpayers' perspective, one benefit of this system would be
that donated development rights would be cash equivalent in the hands of
conservation organizations. In other words, a land trust could maximize the
value of the easements it held. It could sell development rights on parcels of
low conservation value to fund the purchase of those on land with high con-
servation value. A second, more important, benefit is that this approach
would eliminate the donation of notional gifts. Any donor who donated her
development rights would have to do so with the knowledge that her prop-
erty might ultimately be developed. In other words, she would have to be
certain that she wanted to make such a generous gift to a conservation
organization. 9s
One potential argument against using this approach is that it might re-
quire significant changes in both state and federal law. However, the needed
changes would not be overwhelming. It is true that states do not currently
recognize development rights as an interest in real property.196 But the de-
velopment rights described above are nearly identical to state law conserva-
tion easements. They would not be sold on the open market, and in fact
would not be sold at all. A land trust interested in converting them to cash
would simply exercise the option on the underlying land; after closing that
transaction, the doctrine of merger would unite the development rights and
the underlying land in a fee simple.197
'93 The inclusion of the donated option would create an additional incentive for accurate
valuation of the development rights: landowners would want to be certain that, if they were
ultimately required to sell the underlying land, they would receive a fair price for it.
194 See infra text accompanying note 196.
9s For more on options and their use in encouraging the accurate assessment of property
values see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1399 (2005).
'" Some jurisdictions have integrated tradeable development rights into zoning systems.
See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
1 SINGER, supra note 13, at 226-27.
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It is true that Congress would have to make one change to the tax law in
order for these easement transactions to occur. The law would have to re-
quire that donations of development rights be accompanied by the donation
of a permanent option to purchase the underlying land.'98
Another likely objection to this proposal is that it would discourage
participation in the Section 170(h) program. Like other property donors,
landowners would be faced with the prospect that they would actually have
to part with rights they wish to enjoy as well as those they do not. In addi-
tion, landowners would feel as though this result would be inconsistent with
their desire to preserve their land.
Neither of these concerns is compelling. First, the point of the develop-
ment rights system is to ensure that the donor's parting costs are linked to the
fair market value of the donated property. The system would do this by
making that property available for sale, albeit indirectly, to a real market
actor. Second, while it is true that the donor's land might ultimately be de-
veloped, the donation would contribute to the charitable cause chosen by the
donor - conservation. In fact, if land trusts were to act rationally in buying
and selling development rights, the original donation would be used in its
most efficient form, that is, either as a tool for land conservation or as cash.
VI. CONCLUSION
Data on the average value of donated conservation easements reveal
that donors are, on the surface, exceptionally generous in making gifts of
easements. The only plausible explanation for these data is that donors' in-
centive to donate is strongly linked to their subjective valuation of the costs
of donating. Donating a dollar's worth of easement is a much better deal
than donating a dollar.
While it may be true that the public receives a benefit from easement
donations, it also appears true that donors could be persuaded to donate for a
much lower amount of tax benefit. In the absence of a market transaction,
there will never be accurate information on the price that the public ought to
be paying. Overpaying for easements wastes public dollars that could other-
wise be used for additional conservation.
While the exact amount of overpayment is unknown, there is no debat-
ing the fact that allowing deductions for easement donations provides in-
verse incentives to landowners. As between a landowner who is interested
in developing his property and one who is not, the latter has a greater incen-
tive to donate because his parting costs will be lower. Many years down the
road, it may turn out that, when he made the donation, the donor underesti-
mated the likelihood that he would later be interested in developing. In such
" Options are subject to the Rule against Perpetuities. See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v.
Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996). It is unclear whether an option held by a
charity would constitute a violation. If so, then a change in state law might be required.
892011]
90 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35
cases, it is possible that the public will have made a good deal despite ini-
tially overpaying for the easement. However, the possibility that landowners
will make such mistakes neither represents good policy nor is enough to
justify the entire Section 170(h) program.
